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Abstract 
The Jones Act seaman has de facto power over whether a jury will 
hear his claim through his ability, under Panama Railroad v. Johnson, to 
elect that his claim proceed at law or in admiralty.  A significant conflict 
of laws exists between the federal circuits and several state courts 
regarding whether this election power means the seaman may divest the 
defendant of the right to a jury trial by later amending his complaint from 
law to admiralty.  The Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff whose at-law 
Jones Act claim rests on non-diversity jurisdiction may amend his 
complaint to elect admiralty jurisdiction, even if the defendant previously 
demanded a jury trial.  Several federal circuits that have opined on the 
issue, including the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, have adopted similar 
views. 
Nevertheless, and although a state high court’s opinion on how 
cases proceed in federal court is purely dicta, Illinois has rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s view, placing it squarely in conflict with the Seventh 
Circuit.  Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court, in Endicott v. Icicle 
Seafoods, Inc., adopted Illinois’s view as its own, placing it in conflict, at 
least nominally, with the Ninth Circuit.  This article evaluates Endicott in 
light of the confusion created by the jurisdictional split and argues that 
the State of Washington’s entry into the fray is more likely to invite 
review by the Supreme Court of the United States, which should grant 
certiorari to resolve the conflicts of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Jones Act (alternatively “the Act”) creates a statutory 
negligence cause of action allowing a seaman (or his personal 
representative in case of death) to sue his employer for injuries suffered 
during the course of employment.1  The Act specifies that “the seaman 
may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury.”2 
To spare the Act from challenge on the grounds that Congress had 
unconstitutionally diminished the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction in 
favor of their common law jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled, in 
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, that a seaman has the choice to sue at 
law or in admiralty.3  The Johnson Court also upheld the Jones Act 
plaintiff’s right to make this election between law and admiralty against 
a substantive due process challenge that the statutory grant of the 
election to the plaintiff, but not the defendant-employer, was 
“unreasonably discriminatory and purely arbitrary.”4  The Court aptly 
reasoned, “There are many instances in the law where a person entitled 
to sue may choose between alternative measures of redress and modes of 
enforcement . . . . [I]t has never been held . . . that to permit such a 
choice . . . is a violation of due process of law.”5 
According to a recent case from the Washington Supreme Court, 
Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., the Johnson Court left open the question 
whether the plaintiff’s election power is a right to determine the mode of 
trial (jury or nonjury) or merely the right to select the Jones Act claim’s 
jurisdictional basis (law or admiralty).6  If the former view is correct, 
then the plaintiff’s election power actually would be tantamount to a 
right to control whether a jury can hear the claim, regardless of the 
defendant’s preference.7  If the latter view is correct, then the plaintiff 
would have the initial right to determine the jurisdiction, and the right to 
a jury would be merely incident, potentially leaving the defendant a 
vested right to try the case before a jury if the plaintiff first elects 
jurisdiction at law.8  By ruling in favor of the latter, the Washington 
                                                                                                             
 1 Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006). 
 2 Id. (emphasis added).  Hereinafter, this statutory right is referred to as the 
plaintiff’s election power. 
 3 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924); see David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, 
Understanding Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
the Seaman’s Elections Under the Jones Act, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 229, 237 (2001); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting the Supreme Court power over “all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”). 
 4 Johnson, 264 U.S. at 392. 
 5 Id. at 392–93. 
 6 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 765 (Wash. 2010). 
 7 See id. at 763, 765. 
 8 Id. at 765. 
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Endicott entered it into what it considered a 
jurisprudential split between those two views.9 
This paper examines the case history leading up to Endicott and 
asserts that there are actually three, not two, jurisprudential views of the 
plaintiff’s election power.10  Although Washington conflates the Fifth 
Circuit’s view with the Illinois Supreme Court’s view, the two positions 
are actually distinguishable.11  This paper contends that the Fifth 
Circuit’s cases on point were wrongly decided because they read the 
plaintiff’s election power too broadly.12  Moreover, this paper argues that 
California’s view, addressed infra, is a misreading of the Fifth Circuit’s 
view and is wrong.13  Thus, this issue is ripe for Supreme Court 
certiorari.14  Illinois’s view, on which Endicott leans, is the most 
jurisprudentially coherent.15  Ideally, the Supreme Court should overrule 
the Fifth Circuit’s view of the plaintiff’s election power and adopt 
Illinois’s interpretation regarding the manner in which federal cases 
designated at law should proceed.16  At the very least, the Supreme Court 
should uphold the authority of the States to configure the rights to jury 
trials in state Jones Act cases as they see fit.17 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Fifth Circuit’s View of the Plaintiff’s Election Power in 
Rachal 
In Rachal v. Ingram Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
leading decision addressing the Jones Act plaintiff’s election power, the 
court examined whether the defendant, Ingram, retained a vested right to 
trial by jury in a Jones Act claim after the seaman-plaintiff, Rachal, had 
initially demanded a jury.18  Although the plaintiff’s complaint had 
demanded a jury trial, the plaintiff had filed a contradictory cover sheet 
                                                                                                             
 9 Id. at 765, 767.  Endicott defines the split of authority as “among federal and state 
courts as to which interpretation of Johnson is correct, with the Ninth Circuit and 
California on one side and the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana, and Illinois on 
the other.”  Id. at 765.  The Washington Supreme Court followed the Illinois view.  Id. at 
767. 
 10 See infra Parts II, IV(A). 
 11 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; infra Part IV(A)(1)–(2). 
 12 See infra Part IV(B). 
 13 See infra Part IV(C). 
 14 See infra notes 255–62 and accompanying text; infra Part V. 
 15 See infra Part IV(D). 
 16 See infra Part V. 
 17 See infra Part V. 
 18 795 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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designating the claim in admiralty under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(h).19  The plaintiff amended his complaint a year later to clarify that the 
claim was , in fact, an action in admiralty.20  The defendant asserted a 
right to a jury trial, which the plaintiff moved to strike.21  The district 
court granted the motion to strike, holding that the plaintiff did not need 
the defendant’s consent under Rule 39(a).22 
The district court determined that the only two bases for jurisdiction 
were the general maritime law and the Jones Act.23  It reasoned that the 
rule otherwise requiring a defendant’s consent to amend a complaint’s 
demand for a jury trial was inapplicable because “no right to a jury trial 
existed for” defendant Ingram.24  As the Seventh Amendment does not 
protect the right to jury trial in admiralty cases, the district court 
impliedly reasoned that only the Jones Act plaintiff has the right to 
demand a jury trial in the first place.  Thus, the plaintiff retained the 
power to convert his claim at law back to an admiralty nonjury claim.25 
On appeal, the defendant contended that once a jury trial had been 
elected under Rule 9(h), the Seventh Amendment preserved it as a matter 
of right.26  The seaman-plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that his initial 
right to elect admiralty jurisdiction meant that he had the authority to 
later revoke the demand for a jury trial by electing under Rule 9(h).27 
Addressing the defendant’s argument, the Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has extended the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trials to areas uncontemplated at the time of the 
framing of the Constitution—even to certain modern legal claims 
mimicking equity.28  The Fifth Circuit explained, however, that the right 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id.; see Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman . . . may elect to bring a 
civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”).  The applicable 
rule of civil procedure states, in pertinent part: 
If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction and also within the 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground, the pleading may designate the 
claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and 
the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(1) (2012) [hereinafter Rule 9(h)]. 
 20 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1212. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 600 F. Supp. 406, 407 (W.D. La. 1984). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Rachal, 600 F. Supp. at 407; see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines. Co., 374 U.S. 
16, 21 (1963). 
 26 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1212 (citations omitted). 
 27 Id. at 1212–13. 
 28 Id. at 1213 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1970) (upholding the 
right to jury trial in shareholder derivative suits once shareholders were given standing at 
law to proceed for their recalcitrant corporations); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 
469, 478 (1962) (holding trademark infringement claims to be actions at law and 
6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
to jury trial in a nondiversity case such as Rachal could arise only out of 
the Jones Act’s statutory grant, because admiralty would not otherwise 
recognize the right.29  The right is held by “the seaman, on proper 
request.”30  By contrast, Rachal held that where a Jones Act plaintiff 
pursues his claim in diversity under the federal admiralty jurisdiction 
statute’s saving to suitors clause, both parties have an independent right 
to jury trial.31 
The Rachal court appeared to rely implicitly on its holding in 
Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., in which a fourth-
party defendant argued that simultaneous admiralty jurisdiction and 
diversity jurisdiction over a products liability and negligence case 
necessitated that it could demand a jury in diversity.32  The Harrison 
court held that, even in a claim with multiple bases for jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff “may preclude the defendant from invoking the right to trial by 
jury which may otherwise exist” simply “by electing to proceed under 
9(h) rather than by invoking diversity jurisdiction.”33  Implicitly relying 
on Harrison, the Rachal court observed that, without a separate 
jurisdictional basis such as diversity, the only thing giving rise to a jury 
trial was the plaintiff’s election to proceed at law.34  Thus, Rachal 
reasoned that the defendant’s ability to preserve a jury trial existed only 
to the extent the rules of civil procedure might have prevented the 
plaintiff “from withdrawing his jury demand.”35 
In sum, because the Jones Act plaintiff was proceeding at law under 
Jones Act-federal question jurisdiction, the Rachal court determined that 
the text of the Jones Act gave the plaintiff—and the plaintiff alone—the 
                                                                                                             
upholding the right to a jury trial even where the claim was pled as an “accounting” 
between partners); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) 
(mandating that the trial of legal claims necessitating a jury precede the trial of equitable 
nonjury claims)). 
 29 Id. (citing Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 19–21) (noting that joindered claims in admiralty 
are tried together with Jones Act claims before a jury only as a matter of judicial 
economy). 
 30 Id.; see 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman . . . may elect to bring a civil action 
at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”). 
 31 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213; see 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006) (giving federal district 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, 
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled”) 
(emphasis added). 
 32 577 F.2d 968, 986 (5th Cir. 1978); see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213 (citing id.). 
 33 Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986; see  Rule 9(h).  By implication, the defendant would 
have been able to demand a jury trial had the plaintiff not elected admiralty under Rule 
9(h).  See Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986. 
 34 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214. 
 35 Id. 
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right to a jury trial.36  By contrast, “[w]hen there is diversity jurisdiction . 
. . both parties have an independent basis for a jury trial if the plaintiff 
has chosen to pursue his Jones Act claim through the ‘saving to suitors’ 
clause in a civil action.”37 
B. The Fifth Circuit Reinforces Rachal with Linton 
In Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Fifth Circuit 
considered whether a Jones Act plaintiff’s election to proceed in state 
court without a jury was proper.38  At the time, Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure article 1732(6) afforded a maritime plaintiff suing in state 
court under the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 the option of 
forcing a nonjury trial.39  The defendant removed the case to federal 
court, asserting that, by allowing a plaintiff to designate his state claim as 
“admiralty or general maritime” and proceed without a jury, article 
1732(6) was a constructive invocation of exclusive federal admiralty 
jurisdiction.40  The district court, agreeing with the defendant, denied the 
plaintiff’s motions to remand and reconsider under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 
based on improvident removal and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.41  
The plaintiff appealed.42 
With respect to the plaintiff’s Jones Act claim, the Fifth Circuit 
opined that the “antecedent right implicit in” the Jones Act lies in 
admiralty by virtue of the fact that plaintiffs may elect to proceed for 
damages at law.43  Accordingly, the court summarized the defendant’s 
argument about the plaintiff’s election power as asserting a distinction 
between (1) the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court and 
                                                                                                             
 36 See id. at 1217 (ruling that “when the initial complaint was filed” under federal 
question—not diversity— jurisdiction in federal court “and the plaintiff chose a civil 
action” only the plaintiff retained the right to trial by jury); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2006) (outlining federal question subject matter jurisdiction). 
 37 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213. 
 38 964 F.2d 1480, 1482–84 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 39 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1732(6) (1990) (“A trial by jury shall not be 
available in . . . [a] suit on an admiralty or general maritime claim under federal law that 
is brought in state court under a federal ‘saving to suitors’ clause, if the plaintiff has 
designated that suit as an admiralty or general maritime claim.”).  Louisiana has since 
repealed this provision.  LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art 1732(6) (2012) (“A trial by jury 
shall not be available in . . . [a]ll cases where a jury trial is specifically denied by law.”). 
 40 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1483. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1489; see Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (stating “the seaman may 
elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury”); Panama R.R. Co. v. 
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924) (highlighting the choice between suing in admiralty or 
suing at law with a “right of trial by jury”). 
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(2) an action at law, available in state or federal court, which “must be 
tried to a jury.”44 
Calling upon Rachal, the Linton court stated that the Jones Act’s 
“right to an ‘action for damages at law’ protects the seaman’s ‘right of 
trial by jury.’”45  Linton also recapitulated Rachal’’s distinction between 
Jones Act nondiversity actions at law and Jones Act diversity actions at 
law, granting the plaintiff the unilateral right to choose a jury or nonjury 
trial in the former, while recognizing the right to a jury trial vested in 
both parties in the latter.46  The Fifth Circuit observed that the 
Constitution does not mandate, but merely permits, the invocation of the 
right to a jury trial in an action at law.47  In light of Rachal’’s recognition 
that defendants’ rights to a jury trial in federal court differ depending on 
the underlying subject matter jurisdiction, Linton reasoned, by analogy, 
that there must not be a constitutional bar to a right to a nonjury trial “if 
state procedure allows it.”48 
The Linton court also held that the saving to suitors clause permits 
a nonjury trial at the state level if allowed by state procedure.49  The 
court pointed out that the saving to suitors clause gives state courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over all in personam claims seeking common law 
remedies.50  So long as the state court is not “provid[ing] a remedy in 
rem for a maritime cause of action,” or attempting to change federal 
substantive admiralty law, permissible common law remedies include 
equitable and statutory remedies as well as damages “enforceable in a 
court of law.”51  Accordingly, the Linton court reasoned that: 
[A] non-jury trial in state court is not, in and of itself, offensive to 
the general maritime law.  Furthermore, a statutory provision for a non-
jury trial, in and of itself (absent any pretense at in rem proceedings), 
does not constitute an attempt to create “an admiralty side of state court 
which can have no constitutional foundation.”52 
                                                                                                             
 44 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1489–90.  Note, here, the Linton court finds the defendant’s 
assertion that a proceeding in state court through an at-law claim required a jury (versus 
merely allowing one) to be incorrect. Id. 
 45 Id. at 1490 (quoting Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 
1986)). 
 46 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217. 
 47 See Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. at 1486–87 (citing Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 562, 564 
(1954); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924)); see also The 
Hine v. Trevor, 4 U.S. (Wall.) 555. 
 51 Id. at 1486 (quoting Madruga, 346 U.S. at 561; Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52 Id. at 1487. 
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In other words, the saving to suitors clause does not require a jury 
trial for a remedy to fall within its purview.53 
Linton also noted that just because the Louisiana statue referred to 
the state court claims as “admiralty and maritime” did not mean such 
words had converted what were actually civil in personam claims under 
the purview of saving to suitors into bona fide federal admiralty claims.54  
Linton, therefore, first reinforced the Rachal rule that nondiversity Jones 
Act defendants do not have the right to a jury trial.55  It then provided 
that a state may fashion its Jones Act remedies as it chooses so long as it 
does not attempt to afford a true admiralty in rem remedy or contravene 
federal substantive general maritime law.56 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s View in Craig 
The Ninth Circuit weighed in on the meaning of the Jones Act 
plaintiff’s election power in Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co.57  In a Jones 
Act wrongful death claim brought by William Craig’s estate, defendant 
ARCO demanded a jury trial, which the plaintiff did not oppose.58  The 
district court ruled that ARCO did not have the right to a trial by jury 
and, after a bench trial, found for the defendant.59  Craig’s estate 
appealed on the basis that ARCO had the right as the defendant to 
demand a jury trial; that it was prejudicial error for the court to deny a 
jury trial; and that, in the alternative, Craig was entitled to rely on the 
demand anyway.60 
Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in Rachal and Linton, the 
Ninth Circuit held that, whereas the defendant has the right to demand a 
jury when a separate basis for jurisdiction—such as diversity—exists, 
only the plaintiff has a right to demand a jury trial when the sole basis for 
jurisdiction is the Jones Act itself.61  Since there was no diversity 
jurisdiction, ARCO, as the defendant, had no right to demand a jury trial 
                                                                                                             
 53 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1487. 
 54 Id.  That is, the question of whether state law preserved the right to a jury trial or 
right to a nonjury trial did not modify the subject matter jurisdiction of the claim.  Id. at 
1489. 
 55 See supra notes 36, 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 56 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 57 19 F.3d 472, 475–77 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 58 Id. at 474–75. 
 59 Id. at 475. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 475–76 (citing Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 
1489 n.16 (5th Cir. 1992); Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
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under the Jones Act.62  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
could rely on the defendant’s demand only if the defendant’s right to a 
trial by jury had existed in the first place.63 
D. Other Federal Courts Following the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
In Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., the Seventh Circuit impliedly 
followed the Fifth Circuit’s view concerning the Jones Act plaintiff’s 
election power by acknowledging that the plaintiff’s election of 
jurisdiction in a Jones Act claim yields procedural results incident to 
jurisdiction.64  The Seventh Circuit impliedly rejected the notion that a 
Jones Act defendant has a substantive right to a jury trial.65  Likewise, 
the Second Circuit, following the Ninth Circuit, broadly stated that the 
Jones Act “provides seamen plaintiffs with powerful procedural rights, 
such as the unilateral right to elect between jury and non-jury trial.”66  
Federal district courts in various circuits have followed the same 
reasoning, though not all agree.67 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. at 476 (“The plain language of the Jones Act gives a plaintiff the option of 
maintaining an action at law with the accompanying right to a jury trial.  The Act makes 
no mention of a defendant.”). 
 63 Craig, 19 F.3d at 476–77 
 64 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 65 Id. at 671.  The court’s implication that the Jones Act defendant has no substantive 
jury trial right is subtle.  In a footnote of the opinion, the court asserted that it was not 
addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim because it did not retain jurisdiction.  See 
id. at 671 n.9.  Nevertheless, the court expressly stated, “Although it is true that the 
consequence of allowing the Third Amended Complaint to be filed was that the case was 
designated as one in admiralty and that it would therefore proceed to a bench trial rather 
than a jury trial, that consequence is irrelevant for our purposes.”  Id. at 671.  The court 
also stated, “Orders which do not determine parties’ substantive rights or liabilities, 
however, are not appealable . . . even if those orders have important procedural 
consequences.”  Id. (quoting Ingram Towing Co. v. ADNAC, Inc., 59 F.3d 513, 517 (5th 
Cir. 1995)).  Thus, in order to hold that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the appeal or 
the merits of the case, the Wingerter court necessarily implied that the defendant’s loss of 
the jury trial was a procedural issue, not a substantive one.  See id. 
 66 Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 133 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 67 Compare Quinn Constr., Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., No. CIV.A. 07-406, 
2010 WL 4909587 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010), Adams v. James Transp., LLC, No. 5:09-
CV-00036-R, 2010 WL 4789290, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2010) (“Only a plaintiff may 
assert the right to a jury trial under the Jones Act.”), and Ferdinand v. Cnty. of Nassau, 
No. CV 02-4024, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18272, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004) (“Under 
the Jones Act, the plaintiff, but not the defendant, had a right to demand a jury 
trial . . . .”), with Abbott v. Bragdon, 893 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Me. 1995) (misreading 
Rachal as support for the notion that a defendant in a Jones Act case has a constitutional 
right to jury trial once the plaintiff has elected to proceed at law), and In re Armatur, 
S.A., 710 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.P.R. 1989) (“[O]nce a plaintiff has demanded a jury . . . 
he cannot subsequently withdraw the jury demand and designate his claim as one in 
admiralty, without abiding by Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a), which requires all parties to stipulate to 
the withdrawal of a jury demand.”). 
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E. Louisiana’s View 
Relying upon Rachal’s assessment of Jones Act claims pled under 
statutory jurisdiction rather than diversity, Louisiana followed the Fifth 
Circuit in its own opinion about the plaintiff’s election power, holding 
that “plaintiffs alone have control over whether the case is to be tried to a 
judge or a jury.”68  According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
“[P]laintiffs may choose to have the entire case tried to a jury, or may 
withdraw the jury demand.”69  By implication, the plaintiff retains the 
power to determine whether or not a jury hears the case.70 
The court in Parker v. Rowan Companies, Inc. also explained that 
state courts have the power to hear Jones Act claims both through the 
statute’s own jurisdictional grant as civil actions at law and as claims in 
admiralty.71  Like in personam claims in admiralty, Jones Act claims are 
cognizable in state court actions under the saving to suitors clause under 
Parker.72  Parker thus independently reached the same conclusion as 
Linton, namely that “it is within the province of the states to establish 
their own rules for the availability of jury trials” and a “denial of a jury 
trial in a state court” Jones Act claim by state court procedure is valid.73 
F. California’s View 
It is technically incorrect to say that California has ruled on this 
subject, as its leading case with respect to the plaintiff’s election power is 
an unpublished opinion.74  Still, Peters v. City and County of San 
Francisco is instructive because it outlines the state court’s 
understanding of federal jurisprudence on the matter.75  (There was also 
published support for the same view in Illinois state courts before the 
Illinois Supreme Court overruled it, so the interpretation is one that can 
and has percolated elsewhere.76)  Plaintiff Peters sued the City of San 
                                                                                                             
 68 Parker v. Rowan Cos., Inc., 599 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. 1992). 
 69 Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
 70 See id. at 299. 
 71 Id. at 299–301 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1924)). 
 72 Id. at 300–01 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1926)). 
 73 Id. at 301; accord Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 
1486–87 (5th Cir. 1992); see supra part II(B). 
 74 Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 
1994). 
 75 See id. at 792; Roy Dripps, The Seaman’s “Election” Under the Jones Act: A 
Reply to Professors Robertson and Sturley, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 127, 134 (2001) 
(acknowledging Peters’s importance as demonstrative of this particular strain of 
interpretation). 
 76 Allen v. Norman Bros., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (calling 
Jones Act jury rights a matter of substantive federal law and reversing a trial court’s 
refusal to strike the defendant’s jury demand), overruled by Bowman v. Am. River 
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Francisco under the Jones Act after injuring his arm while lashing two 
barges together in preparation for a fireworks display commemorating 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Golden Gate Bridge.77  Peters originally 
demanded a jury but later waived his right.78  The city then demanded a 
trial by jury, which the lower court denied.79 
On appeal, the Peters court acknowledged the Jones Act plaintiff’s 
election power under federal law, namely, that a seaman may sue in “an 
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury.”80  The city 
argued that Peters’s election of a remedy at law in state court required a 
jury trial.81  The court responded by asserting that Linton “rejected the 
specific contention that if a Jones Act or maritime case is to be tried in 
state court, it must be tried to a jury.”82 
The city also argued that it retained an independent right to a jury 
trial.83  The court, however, pointed out that the Jones Act incorporates 
the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA) by reference and that 
FELA cases guide Jones Act jurisprudence.84  The Peters court also 
noted that federal maritime law governs the parties’ substantive rights 
while state law governs procedure.85  Because both the Supreme Court of 
the United States and the California Supreme Court previously had ruled 
that the right to trial by jury is a substantive right under FELA, the Peters 
court reasoned the same must be true under the Jones Act.86  
Accordingly, the Peters court determined that the right to a jury trial 
under the Jones Act was a substantive right and held that federal law 
should control.87 
Peters adopted—as substantive law applicable to every Jones Act 
case in any forum—Rachal’s holding that federal law provides only the 
plaintiff, not the defendant, with the right to trial by jury.88  Peters 
considered the Jones Act plaintiff’s unilateral right to elect a jury so 
                                                                                                             
Transp. Co., 838 N.E.2d 949, 962 (Ill. 2005) (upholding the defendant’s Jones Act jury 
trial right); see infra notes 84–90 and accompanying text; infra Part II(G). 
 77 Peters, 1995 AMC at 788–89. 
 78 Id. at 790. 
 79 Id. at 789–90. 
 80 Id. at 790. 
 81 Id. at 791. 
 82 Id. (citing Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1485, 1488–
90 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 83 Peters, 1995 AMC at 791. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (citing Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988); Jehl v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 833 (1967)). 
 86 Id. at 791–92 (citing Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336; Dice v. Akron, Canton & 
Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); Jehl, 66 Cal. 2d at 833). 
 87 Id. at 792. 
 88 Id. (citing Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1212, 1215–16 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
2012] Defendants Right to Jury Trial 13 
significant that it held the plaintiff had the right to a nonjury trial 
notwithstanding the California Constitution’s guarantee of a jury right in 
all trials.89  Thus, Peters relied upon Linton for the proposition that 
federal law guarantees only the Jones Act plaintiff the choice between a 
jury or nonjury trial in an action at law in state court, and upon Rachal 
and FELA jurisprudence for the notion that this right is substantive.90 
G. Illinois’s Rejection of Rachal and Craig 
Until the Illinois Supreme Court opined on the matter in Bowman v. 
American River Transport Co., Illinois appellate courts were split over 
the issue of the plaintiff’s election power.91  In Bowman, the plaintiff 
filed a Jones Act negligence claim against his employer, and the 
defendants demanded a jury trial.92  Upon motion by the plaintiff, the 
court struck the jury demand.93 After judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 
the defendants appealed in part, asserting a right to a jury trial in Jones 
Act cases.94 
The Bowman court began by noting that the saving to suitors clause 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 confers concurrent jurisdiction of admiralty and 
maritime claims on state courts and preserves state remedies.95  The court 
also derived five distinct propositions from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: (1) the injured seaman’s negligence 
action may lie in admiralty; (2) alternatively, the action may lie on the 
basis of general federal question and statutory jurisdiction; (3) it is the 
saving to suitors clause that allows general federal and statutory 
jurisdiction to lie in lieu of admiralty; (4) the saving to suitors clause 
                                                                                                             
 89 Peters, 1995 AMC at 792 (“The state constitutional right to jury trial does not 
apply, because the right to a jury trial is an issue of substantive law that turns on federal 
law alone.”).  Contra CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 90 See supra Part II(B); supra notes 74–89 and accompanying text. 
 91 See 838 N.E.2d 949, 962 (Ill. 2005) (upholding the defendant’s Jones Act jury trial 
right). Compare Hendricks v. Riverway Harbor St. Louis, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 757, 765 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2000) (following Allen), Hearn v. Am. River Transp., 707 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding the court’s previous Allen jurisprudence), Hanks v. Luhr 
Bros., Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (following Allen and denying the 
Jones Act defendant the right to trial by jury), Gibbs v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 700 
N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (upholding the rule that only the plaintiff has the 
right to jury trial in Jones Act claims), and Allen, 678 N.E.2d at 318–21 (reasoning that 
federal law mandates that Jones Act defendants have no right to a jury trial and applying 
the same rule to Illinois), with Hutton v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., 795 N.E.2d 303, 
307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (disagreeing with Allen and giving the right to the Jones Act 
defendant to a jury trial). 
 92 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 951. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 952 (citing Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001)). 
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provides ipso facto that Jones Act suits may proceed under federal 
diversity jurisdiction or even in state court; and (5) Jones Act cases lie in 
admiralty when the plaintiff characterizes them as such in federal court.96  
The Illinois Supreme Court further cited Johnson for the crucial 
proposition that “[w]hen Jones Act Cases are brought on any other 
jurisdictional basis [than admiralty], whether in state court or on the law 
side of federal court, they, like other saving-clause cases, are deemed to 
be cases at common law.”97 
The Bowman court then analyzed the statutory construction of the 
language of the Jones Act.98  The court quoted a previous version of the 
Act, which stated: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the 
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for 
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury.”99  The court then stated: 
We believe that anyone well versed in statutory construction, or 
even English grammar, would find the plain language of that 
sentence clearly states that the “election” to be made by the seaman 
pertains to his choice to maintain an action “at law,” and not his 
election of a “right of trial by jury.”  Under the principle of 
statutory construction known as the last antecedent doctrine, 
relative or qualifying words or phrases in a statute serve only to 
modify words or phrases which are immediately preceding and do 
not modify those which are more remote.100 
The court noted that the Jones Act did not specifically grant the 
plaintiff unilateral control over the right to trial by jury per se.101  Rather, 
the court concluded, “[T]he rules of statutory construction clearly 
establish that the ‘election’ referred to in the Jones Act is not the 
seaman’s election of a trial by jury, but his election to proceed ‘at law’ 
rather than in admiralty,” i.e., the plaintiff’s choice pertains to 
jurisdiction, not the mode of trial.102 
The Bowman court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Panama 
Railroad Co. v. Vasquez for the proposition that there exists a distinction 
between the substantive rights of the Jones Act plaintiff, namely, the 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 953 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 382–85 (1924)). 
 97 Id. (citing Johnson, 264 U.S. at 382, 388, 391). 
 98 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953. 
 99 Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. app § 688(a) (2000) (emphasis added)).  The operative 
phrase in the updated language is virtually identical.  Compare 46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a) 
(2000), with 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (“A seaman injured in the course of employment . 
. . may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the 
employer.”) (emphasis added). 
 100 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953. 
 101 Id. at 954. 
 102 Id. 
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right to sue in negligence to seek damages, and the procedural guarantees 
incident to whichever form of jurisdiction the plaintiff might invoke.103  
The plaintiff’s election power, according to Bowman, is a choice between 
a suit “at law, with the attendant right to a trial by jury” and a suit “in 
admiralty, where there is no right to trial by jury.”104 
Accordingly, Bowman ascertained that the “varying measures of 
redress” and “different forms of action” described in Johnson reflect a 
choice between law and admiralty, not a direct choice between jury and 
nonjury trials.105  The Bowman court reasoned that, because Johnson’s 
purpose was to determine the constitutionality of the Jones Act, its focus 
was on whether a new maritime cause of action could arise out of or in 
addition to the substantive rights already inherent in the general maritime 
law, without depriving the Supreme Court of its constitutional admiralty 
jurisdiction.106  To wit: 
Johnson in its entirety shows that the “forms of action” choice . . . 
refers to admiralty actions versus at-law negligence actions.  We 
can find nothing . . . which suggests that the term “forms of action” 
could have been intended to refer to a choice between jury and 
nonjury trials in common law actions.  Indeed, the jury trial is 
explicitly referred to “as an incident” of the choice “to proceed on 
the common law side of the court.”107 
The Bowman court rejected the notion that the plaintiff’s election 
power gives a seaman the unilateral right to elect a jury or nonjury trial 
in an action at law.108 
The court also rejected the idea that a jury trial is a substantive right 
inherent in the Jones Act.109  The plaintiff argued that federal substantive 
law, not state procedural law, should govern the demand for jury trials, 
because the Jones Act incorporates FELA by reference and Dice v. 
Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad Co., a United States Supreme 
Court decision, held that a jury trial in FELA cases is a substantive 
right.110  The Bowman court rejected this argument, pointing out that 
even if the jury trial right in Jones Act cases is guaranteed through Dice, 
                                                                                                             
 103 See id. at 955 (citing 271 U.S. 557, 560 (1926)). 
 104 Id. (emphasis added). 
 105 Id. at 955–56 (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924)). 
 106 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 956. 
 107 Id. (quoting Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 958.  But cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 
363 (1952) (holding the right to a jury trial in FELA cases to be a substantive right). 
 110 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 958.  But cf. Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 
AMC 788, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 1994); see supra notes 83–90 and accompanying 
text. 
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it does not necessarily follow that there exists a plaintiff’s right to a 
nonjury trial.111 
Ultimately, the Bowman court concluded that “the availability of a 
jury trial in Jones Act cases is a question that is properly controlled by 
the normal laws of the forum.”112  Determining that jury trials in state 
court are a matter of state law, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed its 
own state constitution and held that it guarantees the right to a jury trial 
in Jones Act claims to both parties.113  The court expressly rejected 
Rachal’s interpretation that only the plaintiff has the right to demand or 
strike the demand for a jury in federal court once the plaintiff designates 
the claim’s subject matter jurisdiction to be at law.114  Notably, this 
placed Illinois in conflict with the circuit in which it sits, the Seventh 
Circuit, which impliedly followed the Fifth Circuit and rejected the 
notion that a Jones Act defendant could demand a jury trial.115 
III. ENDICOTT V. ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. 
As in all Jones Act claims, the seaman in Endicott suffered an 
injury while working for his employer.116  After a fish cart crushed Justin 
Endicott’s arm, he sued Icicle Seafoods in Washington State Superior 
Court under the Jones Act and a general maritime law claim of 
unseaworthiness.117  Endicott moved to strike Icicle Seafood’s demand 
for a jury trial, and the trial court granted Endicott’s motion.118  After a 
bench trial, the court awarded Endicott damages, and Icicle Seafoods 
appealed on several issues, including an assertion to the right to a jury 
trial.119 
The Washington Supreme Court first noted that the saving to 
suitors clause gives maritime plaintiffs the right to sue in state court 
provided the causes of action are in personam and not in rem.120  Reading 
                                                                                                             
 111 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 959. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 959–62. 
 114 Id. at 957.  At least two federal district courts agree.  Abbott v. Bragdon, 893 F. 
Supp. 99, 101 (D. Me. 1995) (misreading Rachal as support for the notion that a 
defendant in a Jones Act case has a constitutional right to jury trial once the plaintiff has 
elected to proceed at law); In re Armatur, S.A., 710 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.P.R. 1989) 
(“[O]nce a plaintiff has demanded a jury . . . he cannot subsequently withdraw the jury 
demand and designate his claim as one in admiralty, while abiding by Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a), 
which requires all parties to stipulate to the withdrawal of a jury demand.”). 
 115 Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5, 671 (7th Cir. 
1998); see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 116 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 763 (Wash. 2010). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 763–64. 
 120 Id. at 764. 
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the text of the original Jones Act closely and impliedly interpreting the 
word “elect” as redundant, the Washington Supreme Court stated, “By its 
terms, the Jones Act allows seamen to sue at law, but not in admiralty, to 
recover for their employers’ negligence.”121 Endicott noted that the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson was a 
thinly veiled way of saving the Act from unconstitutionality.122  Because 
the Act otherwise carved out a negligence action from the Court’s 
admiralty purview, the Johnson court had read into the Act the plaintiff’s 
choice to sue at law or in admiralty.123  The Endicott court stated that 
Johnson left ambiguous whether the plaintiff’s power to “elect between . 
. . different forms of action” is a statutory right to elect the mode of trial 
(jury vs. nonjury) or whether it is the right to select the jurisdictional 
basis of trial (at law vs. in admiralty).  If the latter, the jury trial right 
flows procedurally from the choice of jurisdiction."124 
The court further recognized a “split among federal and state courts 
as to which interpretation of Johnson is correct” but mischaracterized the 
divide as “the Ninth Circuit and California on one side and the Fifth 
Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana, and Illinois on the other.”125 
Because the Ninth Circuit in Craig specifically had stated that 
“[t]he [Jones] Act makes no mention of a defendant,” Endicott 
summarized Craig as using “exclusio alterius reasoning to conclude that 
the defendant in a nondiversity Jones Act suit filed in federal court has 
no right to demand a jury trial.”126  The Endicott court then stated that the 
California appellate court’s unpublished Peters decision “adopts 
reasoning like Craig’s in the state court-context, denying the defendant a 
jury trial right in a Jones Act and general maritime suit filed in state court 
under the saving to suitors clause.”127 
Next, the Washington Supreme Court, assenting to the Defendant’s 
characterization of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ opinions as 
“‘jurisdictional’ position[s],” noted that a “Jones Act election is limited 
to choosing the jurisdictional basis of trial (in admiralty vs. at law) and 
that jury rights flow from this election as procedural incidents.”128  
                                                                                                             
 121 See id. (focusing on the holistic meaning of the Jones Act clause “may . . . bring a 
civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury”). 
 122 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 764–65. 
 123 Id. at 765 (citing Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See id. at 765; supra Part II. 
 126 Id. at 765 (quoting Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 
1994)); see supra Part II(C). 
 127 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765 (emphasis added); see supra Part II(F). 
 128 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765 (quoting Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he injured 
seaman is permitted, but not required, to proceed on the common law side of the court 
with a trial by jury as an incident.”)(emphasis added)); id. (“Federal case law interpreting 
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Endicott believed the Ninth Circuit had misread Rachal and Linton and, 
therefore, sided with the Fifth Circuit view upholding the “jurisdictional” 
position.129 
Endicott continued its analysis with Panama Railroad Co. v. 
Vasquez, noting that the Supreme Court there had decided the saving to 
suitors clause allows Jones Act plaintiffs to bring their in personam 
maritime claims at law with the right to jury trial or in admiralty without 
trial by jury.130  Endicott viewed Vasquez as upholding the jurisdictional 
interpretation of the Jones Act, because the Supreme Court had 
distinguished between suits at law and suits in admiralty with “the jury 
trial right as an incident following from this distinction.”131  The 
Washington Supreme Court saw the “progression of federal cases” as 
“reinforc[ing] this interpretation.”132 
The Endicott court then observed that both Louisiana and Illinois 
(through Bowman) had adhered to the jurisdictional analysis of the 
plaintiff’s election power and that state procedural law should determine 
whether a plaintiff or defendant has the right to demand a trial by jury (or 
vice versa) in state court.133  The court stated definitively: 
We find the analysis in Bowman persuasive.  The Jones Act affords 
the plaintiff the right to elect only the jurisdictional basis for his 
suit.  Once the plaintiff makes his choice of jurisdiction, procedural 
rights flow as normal incidents of the suit.  This means that there is 
no substantive federal right to elect the mode of trial directly.  
Rather, state procedural law determines whether the parties have a 
right to a jury trial.134 
Finally, Endicott queried whether the Washington Constitution 
guarantees the right to trial by jury in Jones Act claims.135  The court 
recognized that the Washington Constitution guarantees the right to a 
                                                                                                             
the Jones Act convinces us that the jurisdictional interpretation is correct.”); see supra 
Part II(A), (B), (D). 
 129 See Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765–66. 
 130 Id. at 766 (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 560 (1926) (“[T]he 
new substantive rights may be asserted and enforced either in actions in personam against 
the employers in courts administering common-law remedies, with a right of trial by jury, 
or in suits in admiralty in courts administering remedies in admiralty, without trial by 
jury . . . .”)). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. (citing Wingerter v. Chester Quarry Co., 185 F.3d 657, 665–68 & n.5 (7th Cir. 
1998); Tex. Menhaden Co. v. Palermo, 329 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1964); McAfoos v. 
Canadian Pac. S.S., Ltd., 243 F.2d 270, 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1957); Williams v. Tide Water 
Associated Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1955); McCarthy v. Am. E. Corp. 
175 F2.d 724, 726 (3d Cir. 1949)). 
 133 Id. at 766–67. 
 134 Id. at 767. 
 135 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 767. 
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jury trial in any cause of action at law that existed, or is analogous to one 
that existed, at the time of statehood.136  According to the court, the Jones 
Act cause of action is rooted in negligence and, therefore, is analogous to 
the common law claims recognized in Washington as of 1889.137  
Accordingly, the Endicott court ruled that the Washington Constitution 
confers the right to a jury trial to both Jones Act parties.138  The court 
subsequently vacated the judgment and remanded for jury trial.139 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. A Summary of the Three Views of the Jones Act Jury Trial Right 
Federal court jurisprudence, as well as that of Louisiana, California, 
and Illinois, suggests there are actually three distinct judicial views 
regarding the right to a jury trial under the Jones Act.140  For clarity, the 
operative text of the Jones Act is restated here: “A seaman injured in the 
course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal 
representative of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with 
the right of trial by jury, against the employer.”141 
1. Rachal-Linton 
The first view, which one might call the Rachal-Linton view, 
interprets the Jones Act plaintiff’s power to “elect to bring a civil action 
at law, with the right of trial by jury,” to be a jurisdictional choice 
between a suit in admiralty and a suit at law.142  Yet, whether or not a 
trial proceeds before a jury or judge is incident to this first jurisdictional 
choice.143  If the plaintiff chooses to proceed in admiralty in federal 
court, there naturally is no jury trial.144  If, however, the plaintiff chooses 
to proceed at law, he may face a second choice: he may file either in 
federal court under a non-admiralty grant of subject matter jurisdiction or 
in state court under the saving to suitors clause.145  If the claim proceeds 
                                                                                                             
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See supra Part II; infra Part IV(A)(1)–(3). 
 141 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 142 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 29–
34 and accompanying text. 
 143 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214, 1217; see supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 144 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), 38(e); see Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1214; see also Fitzgerald v. 
U.S. Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963); Waring v. Clarke, 5 U.S. (How.) 441, 460 (1847). 
 145 Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1483 (5th Cir. 1992); 
see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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in state court, state procedural law governs whether and for whom the 
right to trial by jury exists and how a party secures it.146 
If, on the other hand, the claim at law proceeds in federal court, 
there is yet a third bifurcation: claims that proceed at law in diversity 
give both parties the simultaneous right to demand and retain a jury.147  
Claims that proceed at law solely under general federal question 
jurisdiction and the Jones Act’s statutory language allow only the 
plaintiff to elect whether to proceed with a jury.148  As a trial by jury can 
only arise conditionally out of the plaintiff’s unilateral power to choose 
federal question jurisdiction, the Rachal-Linton view recognizes the right 
to trial by jury as something the plaintiff can opt out of later because the 
plaintiff had the power to opt into it at the outset.149  Thus, when the 
claim is not in diversity, the Rachal-Linton view collapses jurisdiction 
and mode of trial into one question.150  The nondiversity federal 
defendant can neither demand a jury trial nor retain a jury trial if the 
plaintiff moves to strike his own or the defendant’s previous jury 
demand.151 
2. Bowman 
The second view, espoused by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Bowman, agrees with the Rachal-Linton view regarding the nature of the 
plaintiff’s election power: it is a choice between jurisdictional bases, 
admiralty or law, for Jones Act claims.152  At law, the plaintiff may sue 
in state or federal court.153  If he sues in state court, state procedure 
governs the right to a jury trial.154  According to Bowman, however, the 
Fifth Circuit’s distinction between diversity and nondiversity Jones Act 
cases is incorrect.155  In all federal Jones Act cases proceeding at law, the 
                                                                                                             
 146 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1487, 1490; see supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 147 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1489 n.16; Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213; see supra notes 50–54, 
56 and accompanying text. 
 148 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217; see supra notes 45–
47 and accompanying text. 
 149 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1217; see supra notes 36, 46–47, 55, 142 and accompanying 
text. 
 150 See sources cited supra note 149. 
 151 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213–15, 1217; see Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490; supra notes 45–
47 and accompanying text. 
 152 Bowman v. Am. River Transp. Co., 838 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ill. 2005); see supra 
notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 153 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 952–53; see supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 154 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 959–62; see supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 155 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 953–59; see supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text. 
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Bowman doctrine holds that either the plaintiff or the defendant has the 
right to demand and preserve trial by jury.156 
3. Peters 
Under the third view, espoused in California’s unpublished Peters 
opinion, instead of reading “with the right of trial by jury” as an indicator 
of a Jones Act claim’s jurisdiction at law, the court conflates the right of 
trial by jury with the plaintiff’s election power.157  Thus, when cases are 
tried at law—in state or in federal court—only the plaintiff may decide 
whether or not a jury may hear his claims, even if this choice overrides 
otherwise valid state procedural guarantees to jury trials.158 
B. Evaluation of Rachal-Linton:  
The Plaintiff Gave and the Plaintiff Hath Taken Away159 
The conflicts between these views of the right to jury trial in Jones 
Act cases really are not about whether the plaintiff has the right to 
control the mode of trial.160  The plaintiff unquestionably has the right to 
determine at the outset whether he and the defendant will try their case to 
the bench or to a jury, especially considering the Jones Act gives him the 
right to designate his claim in admiralty or at law.161  To the extent the 
law allows the plaintiff to make the choice between state and federal 
court—or, in federal court, between admiralty and a claim at law—the 
plaintiff is the master of his complaint.162  He controls the subject matter 
jurisdiction and the forum.163 
The split of authority, rather, is about whether the Jones Act gives 
the plaintiff so much control of the case that he could unilaterally re-
designate his case from law (with an attendant right to trial by jury) to 
                                                                                                             
 156 Bowman, 838 N.E.2d at 957; see supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 157 Peters v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 1995 AMC 788, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
14, 1994); see supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 158 Peters, 1995 A.M.C. at 791–92; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.  Contra 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 159 Cf. Job 1:21. 
 160 See David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Jones 
Act Cases: Choosing the Forum Versus Choosing the Procedure, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
649, 650 (1999). 
 161 See Rule 9(h) (giving procedural life to the plaintiff’s election power); Panama 
R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924) (creating the plaintiff’s election power); 
Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 669–70 (acknowledging the plaintiff’s power is 
de facto). 
 162 See Rule 9(h); Johnson, 264 U.S. at 391; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 
386, 392 (1987) (acknowledging that the plaintiff has the power to confer federal 
jurisdiction vel non with a well-pleaded complaint and is the “master of [his] claim”). 
 163 See sources cited supra note 162. 
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admiralty without the consent of the defendant.164  Cynically speaking, 
does the plaintiff have the right to designate a claim at law so as to 
garner the right to trial by jury, but also to later convert his claim to 
admiralty when he discovers the identity of the assigned judge and 
believes the bench in admiralty might be more favorable to his claim?165 
The generic plaintiff already exercises significant control when it 
comes to finding a forum favorable to his claim.166  The Constitution 
notwithstanding, it would not be entirely surprising had Congress 
intended for the Jones Act plaintiff—a seafarer and ward of the courts of 
admiralty—to be able to control trial to such an extent that he could 
convert a jury trial into a nonjury trial.167  But the crux of the issue, 
really, is whether such a view comports with the Seventh Amendment 
guarantee of the right to jury trials at law.168  It does not.169 
1. Constitutional and Textual Problems in Rachal 
The Seventh Amendment has never protected the right to trial by 
jury in admiralty, but it has always protected the right to jury trial in 
claims at law.170  Furthermore, “the right to trial by jury” is a term of art 
that contemplates the rights of both the plaintiff and the defendant to 
demand or retain a jury.171  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39 
                                                                                                             
 164 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 650. 
 165 See id. (laying out Jones Act plaintiffs’ filing strategies to ensure the most 
favorable forum for adjudication of their claims). 
 166 See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 (cognizing the plaintiff’s ability to determine 
jurisdiction and forum on the face of the complaint). 
 167 See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529 (1938) (explaining the 
“liberality with which admiralty courts have traditionally interpreted rule devised for the 
benefit and protection of seamen who are its wards”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 
275, 287 (1897) (explicating the admiralty courts’ view that seaman are presumed to be 
deficient in their abilities to look after themselves and that the admiralty courts are their 
guardians).  The Court saw admiralty courts “‘quemadmodum pater in filios, magister in 
discipulos, dominus in servos vel familiares.’”  Robertson, 165 at 287.  This translates to 
“as a father to a child, a master to a disciple, [or] the lord of the household servants.”  See 
GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/ (select “Latin” from the left dropdown 
box, enter the phrase in the first textbox, select “English” from the right dropdown box, 
and read Google’s translation in the right textbox) (last visited November 18, 2012). 
 168 See infra Part IV(B)(1). 
 169 See infra Part IV(B)(1). 
 170 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1989); Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830). 
 171 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192 (“[T]he Seventh Amendment entitles either party to 
demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal courts . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 345 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“If a jury would have been empaneled in a particular kind of case in 1791, 
then the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either party so desires.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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acknowledge and implement this right.172  Once a jury is demanded, 
neither party, generally speaking, can unilaterally revoke or strike the 
demand.173  Constitutionally speaking, why would and how could the 
Jones Act be any different?174 
The Jones Act was Congress’s second attempt at enacting a 
negligence cause of action for seamen in light of the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in The Osceola.175  The Osceola had articulated, along with two 
other principles, the following two bars to negligence claims under the 
general maritime law: 
3. . . . [A]ll the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, 
are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen 
cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of 
another member of the crew beyond the expense of his maintenance 
and cure . . . . 
4. . . . [T]he seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the 
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled 
to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by 
negligence or accident.176 
Congress responded by passing “[a]n Act [t]o promote the welfare 
of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States,” which 
included a section stating “[t]hat in any suit to recover damages for any 
injury sustained on board [a] vessel or in its service seamen having 
command shall not be held to be fellow-servants with those under their 
authority.”177  It appears Congress latched onto The Osceola’s 
prevarication in the third principle regarding whether seamen were 
“fellow servants” of their master by purporting to allow a seaman to sue 
for negligence caused by the “seam[a]n having command.”178 
The Supreme Court struck down Congress’s response in Chelentis 
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., holding (a) that even if the case were pursued 
outside of admiralty under the saving to suitors clause, maritime law, and 
                                                                                                             
 172 FED. R. CIV. P. 38, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Rule 38 and Rule 39]. 
 173 Id. at Rule 38(a), (b), (d); id. at Rule 39(a) (allowing the parties to stipulate 
together to waive the jury once demanded or requiring a party to seek leave of the court 
upon motion). 
 174 See infra notes 176–215 and accompanying text; see also Robertson & Sturley, 
supra note 160, at 666–69 (arguing for why there is no difference). 
 175 GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-20, at 
325–27 (2d ed. 1975); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at 233–34. 
 176 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (emphases added). 
 177 Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen in the Merchant Marine of the 
United States, Pub. L. No. 63-302, § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915) (emphasis added); 
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 173, § 6-20, at 325; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, at 
234.  Compare § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, with The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. 
 178 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 325. 
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not the common law, applied; and (b) that maritime law does not 
consider negligence when providing a remedy.179  Chelentis called 
Congress’s act “irrelevant,” because whether or not a “seam[a]n having 
command” acted negligently, the fourth principle—namely, that the 
“seaman is not allowed to recover . . . for the negligence of the 
master”—controlled.180  Furthermore, in the midst of its discussion about 
whether maritime law or the common law applied, Chelentis emphasized 
the differences between rights and remedies, noting that the saving to 
suitors clause for general maritime law claims employs common law 
remedies to enforce maritime rights.181  That is, in a saving to suitors 
case, jury trials and common law standards for liability govern the 
maritime cause of action.182 
Thus, Congress redoubled by passing the Jones Act.183  The original 
language of the Act elucidates Congress’s intent: 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his 
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, 
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United 
States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases 
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the 
death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal 
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at 
law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the 
United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the 
case of railway employees shall be applicable.  Jurisdiction in such 
                                                                                                             
 179 247 U.S. 372, 383–85 (1918); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 173, § 6-20, at 326. 
 180 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 326; see Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384; 
see also The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175 (espousing the fellow servant doctrine, except 
perhaps as to the master of the vessel, yet rejecting a seaman’s cause of action for the 
negligence of any crew member, including the master).  Gilmore and Black seemed to 
posit that no one ever figured out why Congress declined to directly address The 
Osceola’s fourth point: 
By those few lines the Congress apparently intended to change the maritime law as stated 
in The Osceola under which an injured seaman . . . could not recover damages for 
negligence of master or crew in the navigation or management of the ship.  At least, if 
that was not the intention, no one has ever been able to suggest what the intention was. 
See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 325. 
 181 Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 383–84 (“The distinction between rights and remedies is 
fundamental . . . . [W]e think, under the saving clause a right sanctioned by the maritime 
law may be enforced through any appropriate remedy recognized at common law.”). 
 182 Id. at 379, 382–83. 
 183 GRANT & GILMORE, supra note 175, § 6-20, at 326 (noting, whimsically, that the 
Court “goaded Congress into doing it the hard way”); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 3, 
at 234. 
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actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant 
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.184 
By expressly extending FELA’s “common-law right or remedy” to 
this new cause of action, in conjunction with a slew of terms of art that 
signaled an action at common law, Congress made clear it was creating a 
common law negligence action enforceable in common law courts as 
opposed to a maritime remedy.185 
In context, Congress placed the right to trial by jury in the text as a 
descriptor of the sailor’s election to “maintain an action for damages at 
law” (currently: “bring a civil action at law”) so that it would be evident 
to the Supreme Court that the Jones Act was not infringing on the 
Court’s constitutionally-provided, original admiralty jurisdiction over the 
general maritime law.186  Congress was not modifying the general 
maritime law’s prohibition of negligence causes of action per se.187  
Consequently, it is very unlikely that Congress envisioned the plaintiff 
controlling the right to trial by jury vel non in a legal cause of action 
analogous to negligence on land, subject—like any other action at law—
to the Seventh Amendment.188  In any similar action at law, either the 
plaintiff or the defendant could demand a jury.189 
Upon review, the Supreme Court asserted a potential conflict 
anyway: the Johnson Court entertained the strawman that Congress was 
attempting to “carve out” a cause of action from the general maritime 
law.190  Yet, to avoid declaring unconstitutional Congress’s negligence-
for-seamen cause of action after previously having done exactly that, the 
Court deftly held that Congress intended for Jones Act plaintiffs to be 
able to choose between suits at law and admiralty.191 
Thus, it was the Supreme Court that created the plaintiff’s election 
power, a jurisdictional choice between law and admiralty for Jones Act 
plaintiffs—the one reflected in Rule 9(h) today.192  The text of Johnson 
illustrates this character of the election by noting that further rights, such 
as the right to a jury trial, are “incident” to the jurisdictional basis of a 
                                                                                                             
 184 The Jones Act, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (emphasis added). 
 185 Compare id. (“common-law right or remedy”), with Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 383 (“It 
is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.”), 
and The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866) (saying the same). 
 186 See sources cited supra note 185. 
 187 See sources cited supra note 185. 
 188 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (recognizing the right for either 
party in an action at law to demand a jury trial). 
 189 See id. 
 190 See Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 387–90 (1924). 
 191 Id. at 388–89. 
 192 Id.; accord Rule 9(h). 
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Jones Act plaintiff’s claim.193  On this point, the Fifth Circuit, Ninth 
Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Illinois Supreme Court and Washington 
Supreme Court all agree that the right to trial by jury is incident to the 
jurisdictional election of the plaintiff.194  Only California disagrees (or 
may disagree given that Peters was an unpublished intermediate 
appellate level case).195 
The Court may have interpreted the Jones Act in a way that 
preserved admiralty jurisdiction, but nothing in Johnson indicates the 
Court was taking the extraordinary step of modifying the bilateral 
meaning of right to trial by jury once a Jones Act plaintiff has made his 
election at law, either in diversity or under federal question 
jurisdiction.196  Before Rachal, the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Penrod 
Drilling recognized precisely that there was no such distinction.197 
The Penrod court held that the trial court had deprived the 
defendant of his right to trial by jury by allowing the plaintiffs to re-
designate their claim as one in admiralty under Rule 9(h) after the 
defendant already had designated the claim at law and demanded a 
jury.198  The court articulated the issue as whether “the plaintiffs, through 
the device of amending their complaints to state admiralty and maritime 
claims under Rule 9(h), effectively withdr[e]w their demands for jury 
trials without compliance with the specific procedures set forth in Rule 
39(a) . . . .”199  Penrod answered in the negative, citing the Seventh 
Amendment.200 
Rachal, therefore, diametrically departed from the Fifth Circuit’s 
previous jurisprudence.201  Why Rachal did this is speculative, but the 
illuminating question is: how?202  Rachal distinguished Penrod by noting 
that the Jones Act claim in Penrod rested on diversity jurisdiction while 
plaintiff Rachal’s at law claim was one of federal question jurisdiction.203  
Following Penrod to the letter of its facts, Rachal held that Jones Act 
                                                                                                             
 193 Johnson, 264 U.S. at 390–91; see Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 670. 
 194 See supra Parts II(C), (D), III, IV(A)(1), (2). 
 195 See supra Part IV(A)(3). 
 196 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663 (calling the distinction between 
one type of at-law jurisdiction over the other with respect to jury trial rights 
“unprecedented”). 
 197 469 F.2d 897, 902–03 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 198 Id. at 903. 
 199 Id. at 902. 
 200 Id. at 899. 
 201 Compare id. at 899–903, with supra Parts II(A), (B), IV(A)(1), (2). 
 202 See infra notes 204–11 and accompanying text. 
 203 Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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claims in diversity vest a right to jury trial to both the plaintiff and 
defendant because diversity is an “independent basis” for jurisdiction.204 
Recognizing that the jury trial right arises from the text of the Jones 
Act, the Rachal court also asserted by fiat that Jones Act claims heard as 
federal questions do not confer the right to jury trial to the defendant, 
because the right is one granted by statute.205  Rachal noted that in a 
nondiversity action, the Jones Act right to a jury trial derives solely from 
statute.206  Therein lies Rachal’s conceit: the right to a jury trial at law is 
not statutory as Rachal holds, but constitutional.207  Yet, the Rachal court 
strangely buried an express admission to the contrary in a footnote, 
stating that the true basis for the jury trial was the Seventh Amendment 
and that diversity was merely a basis for jurisdiction.208  If so, then why 
would all the normative rights to common law jurisdiction, including the 
defendant’s right to preserve a jury trial demand, not attend?209  In short, 
Rachal both fabricated the distinction between federal question and 
diversity jurisdiction for purposes of the vested right to a jury in a Jones 
Act claim and also contradicted its own argument.210 
The distinction between federal question and diversity jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis jury trials is bizarre considering that diversity claims are 
tantamount to state general jurisdiction claims heard in a federal forum 
simply to avoid parochial local bias.211  If the Seventh Amendment were 
inapplicable under one form of jurisdiction but not the other, it should be 
inapplicable in diversity jurisdiction since the Seventh Amendment is not 
incorporated to the states.212  In fact, it was an open question whether the 
Seventh Amendment applied in diversity until the Supreme Court 
decided so in Simler v. Conner.213  Federal question civil cases have 
always required a jury.214 
                                                                                                             
 204 Id. at 1213. 
 205 See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 662–63 (stating that Rachal “seized 
upon” this distinction in order to control the outcome). 
 206 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1213. 
 207 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974). 
 208 Rachal, 795 F.2d at 1216 n.8; Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663 n.90. 
 209 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192; Panama R.R Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391 (1924) 
(noting that jury trial rights are incident to common law jurisdiction). 
 210 See supra notes 201–209 and accompanying text. 
 211 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 212 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 192 n.6 (expressly refusing to incorporate the Seventh 
Amendment to the states). 
 213 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 667 n.121; see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 
221, 222 (1963) (considering the question whether, and deciding affirmatively that, the 
Seventh Amendment applies to diversity actions in federal court). 
 214 See Simler, 372 U.S. at 222 (considering whether diversity actions, as a matter of 
course, would be subject to the Seventh Amendment, as “other actions,”—which can 
only mean federal question and statutory jurisdictional claims—already were). 
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2. Linton’s Problematic Dicta 
On the questions actually presented, Linton was well-reasoned.215  
By distinguishing, at the very least, between a claim at law in federal 
court and a common law/saving to suitors claim in state court, Linton 
correctly applied jurisprudence that reaffirmed the states’ sovereignty 
over procedure in their own forums and recognized that the Seventh 
Amendment is not applicable to state civil trials.216  The Linton court 
held that state procedure would follow the plaintiff’s election.217  Again, 
almost all courts agree on the point that Jones Act cases in state court 
follow state procedure, whatever that may be.218 
Linton went further than it needed to, however, by making explicit 
what Rachal had implied: it stated that defendants have no vested right to 
a jury trial in Jones Act cases pled as federal questions.219  This was 
classic obiter dictum because it was wholly unnecessary to determining 
whether Jones Act defendants have a right to a jury trial in state court.220  
Linton could have ignored Rachal, but it chose to reinforce a dubious 
interpretation of the Jones Act.221  As to the jury trial right in state court, 
Linton is correct; as to the federal at-law forum, it is superfluous and 
suffers the same constitutional defects as Rachal.222 
C. Evaluation of the Peters View:  
“O, that way madness lies; let me shun that.”223 
The thrust of California’s Peters view is that the plaintiff’s election 
power is a substantive right not only over jurisdiction but over the mode 
of fact-finding at trial.224  Peters effectively read this right as allowing 
the plaintiff to choose whether it wanted a jury or nonjury trial in Jones 
Act cases, irrespective of the rights California guarantees to its 
                                                                                                             
 215 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 663–64 (calling Linton’s explication of a 
state’s right to control the jury right in a Jones Act trial “sensible”). 
 216 Id. at 664; see Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1486–90 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
 217 Linton, 964 F.2d at 1490. 
 218 See supra Part II(A)–(E), (G). 
 219 Robertson & Sturley, supra note 160, at 664; see supra note 55 and accompanying 
text. 
 220 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454–55 (1972) (finding dictum relied 
upon by petitioners “unnecessary to the Court’s decision” and not “binding authority”); 
see also U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924) (cognizing dictum as 
something not binding). 
 221 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; supra part IV(B)(1). 
 222 See supra Part IV(A)(1), (B)(1). 
 223 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 3, sc. 4. 
 224 See supra Parts II(F), IV(A)(3). 
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citizens.225  Because the Peters court cites Rachal and jurisprudence 
examining FELA for this proposition, it misreads both.  Significantly, 
every federal court that has reviewed whether state procedure should 
control one’s jury rights in a Jones Act case has demurred from holding 
the right to a jury trial is substantive.226  Peters simply misreads 
Rachal.227 
It also misapplies FELA’s mandatory right to jury trials.228  Dice v. 
Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. emphatically stated that “the 
right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by 
[FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’ 
for denial in the manner that Ohio has here used.”229  In fairness to 
Peters, it is evident from the Supreme Court’s holding in Dice that jury 
trials are substantively guaranteed in FELA causes of action.230 
Nevertheless, there are five problems with Peters’s application of 
FELA’s jury right guarantee to Jones Act cases.  First, while the 
Supreme Court has recognized that FELA jurisprudence is substantially 
persuasive for resolving Jones Act claims, it necessarily cannot always 
be binding because of the jurisdictional and substantial factual 
differences between railroad casualty claims and claims involving 
casualties on navigable waters.231  Second, FELA’s universal guarantee 
of a right to a jury trial cannot be fully analogized to Jones Act claims 
since the plaintiff does have the right to plead his Jones Act claim in 
admiralty where no jury will hear it.232 
Third, even if Dice applied to the Jones Act, it would protect the 
parties’ rights to a jury in state court, regardless of state court procedure, 
and not the right to a nonjury trial.233  There is absolutely no mention of a 
railroad employee’s right to a bench trial in Dice.234  Peters set forth the 
proposition that jury trial rights are substantive and guaranteed to the 
plaintiff no matter the forum, but then fallaciously extended the 
proposition to guarantee the plaintiff the right to a bench trial.235 
                                                                                                             
 225 See supra Part IV(A)(3). 
 226 See supra Part II(A)–(E), (G). 
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 229 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). 
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 231 See Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958). 
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Fourth, the application of FELA as a guarantee of a nonjury trial is 
hard to indulge because it would be unnecessary for a seaman who can 
already sue without a jury in admiralty.236 
Fifth, and finally, no state or federal court has ever agreed with 
Peters’s broad reading that the Jones Act’s jury right substantively 
overrides state procedure.237  Peters also conflicts with the opinion of the 
Ninth Circuit, i.e., Craig, further highlighting the split of authority on 
this issue of the right to trial by jury in Jones Act cases.  It also ignores 
Panama Railroad v. Johnson’s clear distinction between the jurisdiction 
of a Jones Act case and the procedural incidents that arise out of that 
jurisdiction, which include the right to trial by jury.238 
D. Evaluation of the Bowman View: Here Come the “Ineddicated, 
Vulgar, Groveling Wretches”239 
In light of the interplay between the original language of the Jones 
Act and the analysis provided in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 
Bowman’s narrow textual analysis regarding the placement of the phrase 
right to trial by jury is even more compelling.240  Whether it is true that 
Congress intended to establish a negligence cause of action solely at law 
without any reference to admiralty jurisdiction whatsoever, or create the 
jurisdictional election as Johnson opined, both point to the conclusion 
that the phrase right of trial by jury was a modifier of some antecedent.241  
Had the Johnson Court read the Jones Act at face value, the phrase right 
of trial by jury would have served as one of several linguistic markers 
denoting a common law cause of action.242  Even pursuant to Johnson, 
however, right to trial by jury is still best interpreted as a linguistic 
modifier of the antecedent jurisdictional election.243 
Rachal and Linton have attempted to breathe independent life into 
right to trial by jury as part of the plaintiff’s election power, an approach 
Illinois has soundly rejected.244  Strictly speaking, though, Bowman 
suffers from the same problem Linton does, which is that Illinois 
engaged in obiter dicta by specifically rejecting Rachal and its line of 
                                                                                                             
 236 See Rule 9(h); see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 363 
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cases.245  Bowman was actually overruling a lower court’s use of Rachal 
as support for the proposition that the plaintiff’s election power includes 
control over the right to a jury trial, but the fact that the Bowman court 
took the time to expressly reject Rachal technically means it was 
engaging in dicta.246  Still, Illinois has both acknowledged the problem 
with Rachal and Linton and helped to create a split of authority leading 
to Endicott—not just with the Fifth’s Circuit’s view, but also by 
extension with the Seventh Circuit’s view.247 
E. Endicott’s Confusion and Clarity 
The Washington Supreme Court quite boldly states what Panama 
Railroad Co. v. Johnson skirted around: the Jones Act by its own terms 
established only an action at law.248  The Endicott court recognized that 
Johnson was a “fictitious reading of the [Jones Act]” meant to sidestep 
constitutional defects.249  The court, however, incorrectly opined that the 
“ambiguity” left by Johnson’s creation of the plaintiff’s election power 
pitted the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Louisiana and Illinois against 
the Ninth Circuit and California.250  The court clearly missed the nuanced 
tripartite view between the various courts and inaccurately conflated the 
Ninth Circuit’s view with California’s. 
In fairness to Washington, what concerned Endicott, that is, the 
issue of whether the right to a jury trial in a saving to suitors case is 
procedural or substantive, can elicit only two responses: yes or no.  By 
the time Washington entered the fray, every court other than the 
California Peters court agreed that the saving to suitors clause gave the 
states the procedural power to fashion their own common law 
remedies.251  It appears Washington conflated Craig and Peters because 
both used “exclusio alterius reasoning” to hold that the Jones Act’s 
failure to mention the defendant necessarily meant the Act was giving a 
unilateral right to the plaintiff to select a jury.252  Fundamentally, though, 
Craig does not hold that states must always prohibit defendants from 
                                                                                                             
 245 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454–55 (1972); supra note 217 and 
accompanying text; see also U.S. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924) 
(cognizing dictum as something not binding). 
 246 See sources cited supra note 245. 
 247 David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments: Developments 
in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 493, 522 (2011). 
 248 Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 764–65 (Wash. 2010); see supra 
notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 249 Endicott, 224 P.3d at 765; see supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra Part IV(A) (summarizing the split). 
 251 See supra Part II. 
 252 See Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 224 P.3d 761, 765 (Wash. 2010). 
32 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
electing jury trials in Jones Act cases.253  Only Peters currently holds 
this, which means that Washington is actually not in conflict with the 
Ninth Circuit.254  But, because Washington asserts that it conflicts with 
the federal circuit in which it lies, this may help draw the Supreme 
Court’s attention to the matter. 
Also, by “find[ing] the analysis in Bowman persuasive,” 
Washington expressly joined Illinois, which explicitly rejected Rachal 
and is itself in conflict with its own federal circuit, the Seventh Circuit.255  
By expressly following Bowman, Washington added to the confusion 
because it effectively asserted the view that the plaintiff’s election power 
is the same in both Illinois and the Fifth Circuit.256  Yet, because Endicott 
was focused on whether the plaintiff’s election power involved a matter 
of jurisdiction, it did not need to address the Fifth Circuit’s 
considerations of federal procedural rights in a federal forum.  In other 
words, on the point that mattered to Washington (jury rights in state 
forums) the court was in agreement with the Fifth Circuit and Illinois, 
and there really were only two views.257  The Washington Supreme Court 
did not need to address the crux of the matter in at-law cases in federal 
court; thus, it was unnecessary to formally recognize a doctrinal split 
between Illinois and the Fifth Circuit. 
Strangely, however, Endicott did informally acknowledge the Fifth 
Circuit’s contradictory view toward diversity and nondiversity 
jurisdiction in a footnote.258  The Washington Supreme Court 
characterized the Ninth Circuit’s view as “uncritically adopt[ing]” the 
Fifth Circuit’s view toward diversity- and nondiversity-driven jury 
rights.259  The court lent credence to the Fifth Circuit’s distinction by 
noting that both cases were “consistent with the jurisdictional 
interpretation of the Jones Act.”260  Thus, Endicott implicitly agreed with 
Rachal about the distinction between the defendant’s right to a jury trial 
vis-à-vis diversity or federal question jurisdiction while expressly 
adopting Bowman’s reasoning.261  Nevertheless, Bowman expressly 
rejects the jurisdictional distinction Rachal and Linton make.262 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Endicott expressly agrees with the reasoning of both Bowman and 
the Rachal-Linton dyad even though Illinois’s and the Fifth Circuit’s 
views are irreconcilable.  Endicott expressly rejects Craig even though 
Craig adopts the reasoning of Rachal and Linton wholesale, leading 
Endicott nominally to reject controlling federal law in the Ninth Circuit 
where Washington sits.  Peters is in conflict with every other case, 
including Craig, even though the Peters court purports to have found 
support in Rachal and Linton.  Rachal contrived a way to ignore Penrod, 
previous jurisprudence on point in its circuit, while Linton quite 
unnecessarily reinforced Rachal’s mistake.  Bowman’s express rejection 
of Rachal impliedly puts it in direct conflict with Wingerter, controlling 
federal law in the Seventh Circuit where Illinois sits.  And Louisiana’s 
Parker holding, which comports with Bowman’s (and Endicott’s) views 
about state jurisdictional authority over jury trials, relied on the Fifth 
Circuit for its reasoning.  Finally, Endicott mislabels which jurisprudence 
is on which side.  This confusion begs for Supreme Court intervention. 
Post-Endicott, whenever the next Jones Act case contemplating the 
right to jury trial is ripe for review, the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari to absolve the courts of their patent confusion.  Under Panama 
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, as understood by every published decision on 
point, states may determine their own common law remedies, including 
whether and how to grant jury trials, for all Jones Act cases they hear, 
and the Supreme Court should affirm this. 
Moreover, there is strong, almost unwavering, support in the federal 
courts for the notion that the Jones Act defendant acquires his right to a 
jury trial only in a diversity claim at law, and not in a federal question 
Jones Act claim.  The Supreme Court, however, should not hesitate to 
overrule this view.  Instead, the Supreme Court should reaffirm the 
election power that it bestowed upon plaintiffs in Johnson and that it 
administers through Rule 9(h)—the right to determine the jurisdictional 
basis and forum for proceeding in Jones Act cases.  But once the plaintiff 
has selected a common law jurisdictional basis in federal court, the 
Supreme Court should vest the right to trial by jury to both the plaintiff 
and the defendant.  It is only fair, and to do otherwise would be 
unseemly.  While the Supreme Court gave the Jones Act seaman, the 
canonical ward of the admiralty courts in need of greater protections, the 
initial unassailable choice to sue for negligence in admiralty or at law, 
the Court should also honor the strictures and protections of the Seventh 
Amendment, which grants all parties the right to demand a jury once a 
claim is filed at law.  Such a holding would remedy the current 
jurisprudential affray, reinforce procedural fairness once the pleadings 
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have been filed, comport with the Court’s own previous jurisprudence, 
and, chiefly, honor the Constitution. 
 
